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FOREIGN BASES: DECLINING ASSET

by

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FOREIGN BASES: DECLINING ASSET

DOWNING deep within Soviet territory, May 1, of the U-2 reconnaissance plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers gave the Kremlin a handy excuse for breaking up the scheduled summit conference at Paris. It provided ammunition also for a new Russian propaganda offensive against American military bases in foreign countries. The U-2 had taken off from a U.S. Air Force base near Adana, Turkey; touched down at an airfield near Peshawar, Pakistan, before crossing into Soviet airspace; and, when its flight was interrupted, was heading across Russia to an airfield at Bodo, Norway. Turkey, Pakistan and Norway are allies of the United States.¹

The U-2 incident produced an abrupt change, not in Soviet foreign policy, but in methods used to promote that policy. Good manners and an attitude of sweet reasonableness suddenly gave way to personal abuse and harsh demands. Where previously Communist spokesmen had been content to urge American withdrawal from foreign bases as a *quid pro quo* for some Soviet concession, they now sought by bluster and threat to intimidate the governments of countries in which the bases are situated. And elements on the left in those countries were encouraged to question, or to stir up popular protests against, the continued presence of American power.

USE OF U-2 AFFAIR IN SOVIET ANTI-BASE CAMPAIGN

News of the downing of the American plane came out of Russia on May 5. Four days later, Soviet Premier Khrushchev, speaking at a Czechoslovak embassy reception in Moscow, warned "countries that have bases on their territories" that "if they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory, we shall hit at those bases." Moscow on May 13 dispatched notes to Turkey, Pakistan and Norway protesting the use or intended use of airfields in those

¹ Norway and Turkey are partners of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This country has a bilateral defense agreement with Pakistan.

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countries for U.S. reconnaissance flights over Russia. The notes reiterated threats of nuclear missile retaliation, asserting that the Soviet Union had "means . . . of annihilating those military bases which are being used for aggressive actions" against it.

Similar threats to hurl bombs or missiles against bases used to facilitate intrusion into Russia of weapons or foreign planes have since been directed against other countries in which the United States has military installations. Khrushchev has even proclaimed what amounts to a doctrine of guilt by proximity. On a visit to Klagenfurt, Austria, July 6, he declared that use of American "rocket installations in northern Italy . . . against the Socialist countries, would constitute a violation of Austrian neutrality."

The Soviet premier, returning to Moscow, extended his barrage of warnings and threats across the Atlantic by promising Cuba a shield of Russian rockets against U.S. intervention. "It should be borne in mind," Khrushchev said on July 9, "that the United States is now not at such an unattainable distance from the Soviet Union as formerly. Figuratively speaking, if need be, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire, should the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to start intervention against Cuba."

In the opinion of Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, U.S.A. (ret.), military analyst of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the Soviets "needed more incidents to bolster the campaign against American bases" and to show doubters at home and abroad that other intruders could not expect to penetrate the country's defenses as the U-2 had done.² However that may be, Moscow on July 11 made known in a note to Washington that an RB-47 U.S. Air Force reconnaissance bomber, missing since July 1, had been shot down by a Soviet fighter in the Barents Sea north of Archangel. Two survivors of a crew of six men were being held for "trial under the full rigor of the Soviet laws."

The Soviet note accused the United States of continuing "espionage flights over the U.S.S.R." despite President Eisenhower's assurances that such flights would be ended. The RB-47, Moscow insisted, had committed a "new gross

² Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, "Overseas Bases," *New Republic*, Aug. 8, 1960, p. 15.

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violation" of Soviet airspace. Washington in turn vigorously denied that the plane was on an espionage mission and declared that it had at no time been closer than 30 miles to Soviet territory. In the United Nations Security Council, July 26, the Soviet Union obtained only the support of Poland for a resolution to condemn the United States, and it vetoed a U.S. resolution for an impartial international investigation of the facts or referral of the question to the World Court.

The RB-47 had taken off on an electromagnetic research flight from a U.S. Air Force base in England and, when the plane disappeared, Norway had given the United States permission to use the Bodo airfield for search and rescue operations. Moscow matched its July 11 note to Washington with notes to both London and Oslo. It told the British government that, by allowing the RB-47 to fly from England, Britain had become "an accomplice in this aggressive act," and it said the British people "must seriously ponder this." The Norwegian government was advised that its position was "to say the least, unwise and dangerous for the Norwegian people." At a news conference, July 12, Khrushchev accused the U.S. government of "gambling dangerously with the destiny of the world." The U.S.S.R. had refrained from retaliating against the RB-47's base in England only because "in this case the intrusion of the American plane was cut short in the very beginning."

LONG SOVIET EFFORT TO PUSH OUT FOREIGN BASES

Current Soviet attempts to frighten countries of the free world into withdrawing the privileges they have granted their American ally are only a continuation by cruder means of a campaign the U.S.S.R. has been carrying on through diplomatic methods for a long time. Ever since the United States evidenced an intention to help Western Europe get back on its feet after World War II, and then to help strengthen it militarily as well as economically against the rising threat from the East, it has been a central aim of Soviet foreign policy to disrupt the Western alliances and deprive West Europeans of the close support of this country.

As early as May 1948, when the European Recovery Program was just getting under way, Soviet Foreign Min-

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ister Molotov complained to Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then U.S. ambassador at Moscow, that the Marshall Plan and "the increasing development of a network of naval and air bases in all parts of the world" were leading sources of tension in East-West relations. Since the Korean War ended, hardly a year has passed that the Soviet Union has not proposed liquidation of foreign bases, outright dissolution of the Western alliances, or some other step calculated to get American armed forces out of Europe.

At a conference of foreign ministers in Berlin in February 1954, Molotov in effect set dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the price for Soviet agreement to reunification of Germany. The Warsaw Pact, drawn up in May 1955 as the Communist answer to West Germany's admission to NATO, was to lapse immediately upon organization of an all-European security system; a basic feature of the Soviet proposal for such a system was complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from all military and air bases in foreign countries. A Soviet disarmament plan advanced in May 1955 likewise proposed a pledge by nations maintaining bases on the territory of other states to liquidate those bases.

A statement on disarmament addressed to the heads of Western governments in November 1956 by Marshal Bulganin, then Soviet premier, proposed a "considerable reduction" of foreign forces stationed in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and the liquidation within two years of all bases of one country on the territory of another. When the question of restricting use of outer space to peaceful purposes became a lively topic of international discussion after orbiting of the first Soviet sputnik in October 1957, Bulganin told President Eisenhower (in a letter of Feb. 2, 1958) that the question could be considered only in connection with American relinquishment of foreign bases. Finally, liquidation of all military bases on foreign soil was included in the second stage of the three-stage plan for "general and complete disarmament of all states" advanced by Khrushchev last Sept. 18 before the U.N. General Assembly.³

In calling for abandonment of foreign bases the Soviet

³ See "Struggle for Disarmament," *E.R.R.*, 1940 Vol. I, pp. 140 and 154-155; "Future of Overseas Bases," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. I, pp. 77-78; "European Security," *E.R.R.*, 1955 Vol. II, pp. 727-728; "Controlled Disarmament," *E.R.R.*, 1955 Vol. II, pp. 472-473.

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U.S. BASES OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (excluding bases not officially listed)

Place	Air Force*	Navy**	Army***	Total
Alaska	3	2	1	6
Aleutian Islands	1	1	—	2
Azores	1	1	—	2
Bermuda	1	1	—	2
Panama Canal Zone	1	3	2	6
Cuba	—	1	—	1
England	15	1	—	16
France	9	—	3	12
Germany	7	1	9	17
Greenland	3	—	—	3
Hawaii	2	6	2	10
Iceland	1	—	—	1
Italy	1	2	2	5
Japan	9	3	2	14
Korea	6	—	5	11
Labrador	1	—	—	1
Libya	1	—	—	1
Morocco	4	1	—	5
Newfoundland	1	1	—	2
Okinawa	2	2	1	5
Pacific Islands	4	4	—	8
Philippines	1	3	—	4
Puerto Rico	1	3	1	5
Saudi Arabia	1	—	—	1
Spain	3	2	—	5
Taiwan	1	—	—	1
Trinidad	—	1	—	1
Turkey	—	1	—	1
	80	40	28	148
Marine bases in Cuba, Hawaii, Okinawa				3

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*As of May 27, 1959. **As of June 30, 1960. ***As of Nov. 17, 1959.

Union has been able to emphasize that it has practiced what it preaches. It returned a naval base at Port Arthur, Manchuria, to Red China in May 1955 and a naval base at Porkkala, near Helsinki, to Finland four months later. Soviet Defense Minister Zhukov said on Sept. 15, 1955: "We have decided to liquidate bases in general. The sooner others follow our example, the better it will be for peace in our opinion." Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Rumania, though not from Hungary, Poland, or East Germany. However, the bases and troop outposts Russia has

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kept are on the periphery of the Soviet Union and, if abandoned, could be quickly reoccupied. Abandonment of U.S. foreign bases and withdrawal of American troops would in most cases involve a pullback of thousands of miles and leave Western Europe on the one hand and the Far East on the other that much more exposed to Communist might.

Khrushchev at a news conference last July 12 said the Soviet Union would recall its troops from Hungary, Poland and East Germany if it could "attain an agreement on the withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national frontiers." But he added: "The United States government does not want to eliminate its military bases on foreign soil, does not want to withdraw its troops. On the contrary, it butts in wherever it can."

EFFECT OF SOVIET THREATS ON FOREIGN COUNTRIES

The tactics of intimidation pursued by Khrushchev since the U-2 episode have not been without effect in the countries which have been particular objects of Soviet wrath. Despite State Department assurance, May 10, that the United States took full responsibility for the reconnaissance flights over Russia and would defend its allies if they were attacked by Soviet missiles, those allies showed signs of acute discomfort. On May 8, a day before Khrushchev issued his first warning, the Pakistani foreign minister had denied knowledge of the U-2's stopover at Peshawar and said that, if inquiry proved the airfield had been so used, Pakistan would protest strongly to the United States "to insure that such a thing does not happen again." Turkey's foreign minister on the same day said his government had not given "any permission to any American plane to fly over Soviet territory."

President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan disclosed at a news conference, May 17, that Pakistan had in fact lodged a protest with this country. Replying a week later to the Soviet note of May 13, Pakistan denied that any aircraft had left Peshawar "in the direction of the U.S.S.R."⁴ A Turkish reply to Moscow, May 26, disclaimed knowledge of or responsibility for the U-2 flight. Norway the next day told the Soviet government it had not been involved in the U-2 flight, and it protested Mos-

⁴ Ayub Khan had conceded at the May 17 news conference that the U-2 could have changed course after taking off from Peshawar.

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cow's threat of a missile attack. The Norwegian foreign minister on May 13 had made protest to the U.S. ambassador against planned landing of the U-2 at Bodo airfield and demanded "precautions" against such landings.

Soviet threatening of Great Britain, following the shooting down of the RB-47, caused a stir in the House of Commons, in the press, and among the public in general. No disposition to give in to the threats was shown, but the wisdom of carrying out a flight so close to the Soviet borders so soon after the U-2 incident was questioned. There was also grumbling over apparent lack of liaison between the British government and the American military. Prime Minister Harold A. Macmillan observed in the House of Commons, July 12, that although there were "of course those who feel that the presence of United States bases in this country is a threat to our national security," he was "bound to say that I think there are many more of us who feel that their absence would be an even greater threat."

Press comment from all sides—Conservative, Laborite, independent—reflected both agreement that the bases were necessary and concern that the British government seemed to have so little to say about their operation. Denis Healey, Labor's spokesman on foreign affairs, complained in the Commons debate on July 12 that the government "was not fully in control of the activities which have been going on." Hugh Gaitskell, Labor Party leader, asserted that it was "perfectly clear" that the agreement of October 1951 between President Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee governing American use of bases in Britain should be reviewed. Macmillan promised to take up the question with President Eisenhower.

No details of the results of ensuing conversations in Washington between American and British delegations were made known. It was reported, July 28, however, that new arrangements had been agreed on that called for notification of the British Foreign Office before potentially risky flights were undertaken.⁵ British officials would not have the right to bar such a flight, but strong objections on their part probably would be heeded. The State Department said the basic 1951 agreement remained unchanged. Only the next day, July 29, a Foreign Office

⁵ Information previously had been given to Royal Air Force officers but had not always been passed on to Cabinet officials.

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spokesman disclosed that discussions were continuing on the question of allowing American nuclear-powered submarines armed with Polaris missiles to use British ports. Consent is expected.

OVERSEAS BASES AND THE GROWTH OF NEUTRALISM

Fear of nuclear attack has given powerful impetus to neutralist sentiment, and consequently has increased opposition to American bases, in some countries. A new defense policy announced last June 22 by the British Labor Party, did not go so far as to call for the unilateral nuclear disarmament of Great Britain that has been advocated in some of the trade unions. However, apparently in response to pressure from neutralists, the party took the position that "in the future our British contribution to the Western armory will be in conventional terms, leaving to the Americans the provision of the Western strategic deterrent."

The Labor Party's policy statement opposed establishment of a European, particularly a German, nuclear deterrent, and it called for dismantling of bases in Britain for Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles. A party spokesman called those fixed American bases a "sitting-duck target" for the Russians. But objection was not raised to use of bases in Britain by U.S. nuclear bombers.⁶ At the same time, it was urged that efforts be made to get the United States to undertake not to use strategic nuclear weapons "without the agreement of NATO." Lester B. Pearson, leader of the opposition Liberal Party in Canada, also would leave the nuclear deterrent to the United States and, specifically, have Canada refuse nuclear-tipped Bomarc ground-to-air missiles for which the Dominion is now building two bases. Pearson insisted there was no neutralism in his proposals; Canada must honor its "collective commitments."

No such scruples, and no such acknowledgment of the need for common defenses, troubled the Japanese leftists who demonstrated last May and June against ratification of that country's new security treaty with the United States. Because U-2 planes had been based in Japan,⁷ the

⁶ Confusion was further confounded, Sept. 7, when the British Trades Union Congress voted approval of the Labor Party's defense policy immediately after adopting a resolution opposing any defense policy based on threatened use of nuclear weapons.

⁷ The State Department said, May 10, that it had assured Japan that the three U-2s based in that country had not been and would not be used for intelligence missions. The planes were later withdrawn from Japan.

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U-2 incident played some part in the Tokyo disturbances. However, the demonstrations did not begin until May 20, nearly three weeks after the Powers plane was brought down in Russia. The treaty whose ratification was objected to, moreover, was more advantageous to Japan than the existing security treaty, which would have remained in effect if the new agreement had not been accepted.

The troubles in Tokyo were plainly of Communist and left-wing Socialist origin. Those elements played on a strong neutralist sentiment and a distinct leaning toward closer trade and cultural contacts with Red China to stir up mass protests against the Japanese government's firm pro-Western alignment.⁸ It was plain to that government, however, that withdrawal of American forces from their bases in Japan would probably open the country to well-nigh irresistible pressures from its Communist neighbors. A Soviet note, June 15, warning Japan of "dangerous consequences" if it completed ratification of the treaty, as it did four days later, was rejected by Tokyo on July 1 as a "slandorous" attempt to interfere in the nation's domestic affairs.

OUTBURSTS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN ALLIED NATIONS

Communist threats and warnings, fear of being drawn into a war between other countries and fear of nuclear retaliation are not the only sources of foreign opposition to U.S. bases. Some of the opposition stems simply from accumulation of vexations and grievances that are bound to attend the prolonged presence of foreign troops. Taking of scarce farm land for air base runways has long been a source of popular resentment in Japan and in Okinawa. Provisions for punishment of servicemen responsible for loss of civilian lives also have caused widespread dissatisfaction and worse.

Destructive anti-American rioting occurred in Taiwan in May 1957 in reaction to the acquittal by a U.S. court-martial of an American sergeant who had killed a Chinese Peeping Tom. Excitement in Japan over the accidental killing of a woman scavenging for empty shell cases on an artillery range subsided only after the U.S. Supreme Court on July 11, 1957, upheld the Defense Department's deci-

⁸ See "Japan: Disturbed Ally," *E.R.R.*, 1960 Vol. I, pp. 401-417. To quiet Japanese fears that American bases in that country might be used to launch nuclear attacks, arrangements were made when the new security treaty was signed last Jan. 19 for consultations between the two governments in specified circumstances.

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sion to turn over the soldier involved (Army Specialist 3/c William S. Girard) for trial by Japanese authorities. So-called status-of-forces agreements to regulate the jurisdictional questions involved in such cases have been concluded with many countries where the United States has foreign bases, and they no doubt have helped to avert more than one unpleasant incident.⁹

Anti-American feeling in other parts of the world where U.S. troops have been present in force has usually been manifested with some restraint. Protests over a series of crimes by American servicemen in Germany several years ago took the form, not of riots or demonstrations, but of press complaints, letters to U.S. officials and, in one case, a municipal council request for withdrawal of the troops stationed near the community.

Irritation over the presence of more than 4,000 American servicemen in the midst of Iceland's population of only 120,000 nearly cost NATO its far northern Keflavik air outpost. Political parties which had campaigned on a pledge to get American forces out of Iceland formed a new government in the summer of 1956, and Washington was given formal notification to withdraw the units stationed in that country since 1951.

Various factors, including easing of international tensions following the Geneva summit conference of 1955, had contributed to the demand for withdrawal.¹⁰ But Icelanders had a change of heart when the Soviet Union suppressed the Hungarian uprising. Renewal of the base agreement, somewhat modified, was announced Dec. 6, 1956. Moscow warned Iceland in April 1957 that withdrawal of American troops was "the only way to insure her security," for the U.S.S.R., if attacked, would be "compelled to strike a crushing blow at the aggressor and his bases wherever they are." However, several thousand U.S. Air Force and Navy men still man airport, radar and communications installations in Iceland. A 1,200-man Army combat team was recently withdrawn in what the Defense Department called a "normal redeployment."¹¹

French refusal to agree to storing of U.S. nuclear weap-

⁹ See "Anti-Americanism and Soldiers Overseas," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. II, pp. 494-500.

¹⁰ See "Future of Overseas Bases," *E.R.R.*, 1957 Vol. I, pp. 75-76.

¹¹ The general commanding U.S. troops in Iceland was recalled at the request of the Icelandic government last September, following an incident in which a sentry allegedly forced two Icelandic officials to lie on the ground when he found them in a restricted hangar.

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ons or to establishment of NATO missile bases on its soil, unless France was given a voice in decisions to use nuclear weapons, has led to closing of three U.S. air bases and to shifting of American bombers to other European bases. However, objection was not to the presence of the Americans but to American policies. An agreement last Dec. 23 to give up U.S. bases in Morocco by the end of 1963 was attributable largely to political factors. The first of four air bases was evacuated on March 4.

Bases in Western Defense Strategy

DEMANDS of national security, prior to entry of the United States into World War II, forced the United States to take the first steps toward development of the present extensive system of overseas military bases. Apart from the leased naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and installations in the Panama Canal Zone, all U.S. overseas bases of a permanent character up to that time had been on American territory—in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean and in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippines in the Pacific. Then, through the celebrated destroyers-bases deal with Great Britain in September 1940, the United States acquired 99-year leases "free from all rent" on base sites in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana. After this country became an active belligerent, its foreign military bases multiplied many times over.¹² At the close of the conflict, a large number of the wartime installations were turned back to the countries in which they were situated or were put in caretaker status. But rising evidence of communism's aggressive and expansive tendencies soon made plain a continuing need for U.S. foreign bases.

POLICY OF CONTAINMENT AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

An anonymous magazine article in the summer of 1947, later disclosed to have been written by George F. Kennan, then head of the State Department's policy planning staff, first gave public expression to the now familiar policy of containing communism. "The main element of any United

¹² See "Overseas Bases," *E.R.R.*, 1951 Vol. II, p. 445.

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States policy toward the Soviet Union," Kennan wrote, "must be that of a long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian tendencies."¹³

The containment policy was already being applied by the United States in Greece and Turkey. Congress that spring had approved a \$400 million military and economic aid program to help Greece resist Communist guerrillas on its northern frontier and to strengthen both countries against the menace of the nearby Red colossus. President Truman, in asking Congress to support the program, had proclaimed what became known as the Truman Doctrine—to support "free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside [Communist] pressure."

Broader applications of the Truman Doctrine and the containment policy were not long in coming. The Marshall Plan for European rehabilitation, put forward by Secretary of State George C. Marshall at Harvard commencement on June 5, 1947, was in effect an extension of the new policies. The Under Secretary, Dean Acheson, had said, May 8, in a speech at Cleveland, Miss., that foreshadowed the new program that "Free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American reconstruction aid."

DEFENSE BUILD-UP AFTER SHARPENING OF RED THREAT

The Communist take-over of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, followed in June by the Berlin blockade, spread consternation through Western Europe and in the United States. Growing recognition of the reality of the Communist threat began to shift attention from problems of economic recovery to problems of defense. The North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, joined 12 nations in a military alliance to which three additional nations later adhered.¹⁴ Congress in October 1949 authorized a complementary Mutual Defense Assistance program.

The great significance of the North Atlantic pact was

¹³ X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947.

¹⁴ The original members of the alliance were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United States. Greece and Turkey became members in 1952, West Germany in 1955.

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that it made the United States an active partner in the defense of Western Europe. Operations under the treaty, however, were slow in getting beyond organization and planning. It was only when outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 re-emphasized the need for stepped-up defense action in Europe that NATO undertook the early creation of a unified defense force. A week before Christmas 1950, Gen. Eisenhower was designated to become again the commander of Allied forces in Europe. The groundwork thereby was laid for elaboration of a network of U.S. and other NATO bases in the North Atlantic Treaty area.

Base rights in Great Britain and on the Continent were supplemented in 1950 and 1951 by new or extended agreements to maintain bases in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Iceland and Greenland. Opposition of European countries kept Spain out of NATO, but the United States took the decision in 1951 to open negotiations which led to the signing in September 1953 of agreements for construction of U.S. naval and air bases in that country and for provision of American military and economic aid.¹⁵

Across the Pacific, the new Republic of the Philippines in 1947 had accorded the United States the right to maintain land, sea and air bases for 99 years, and in 1951 the two nations signed a mutual defense treaty. The United States concluded defense or security treaties the same year with Japan and with Australia and New Zealand. A defense treaty with the Republic of Korea followed in 1953 and with the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan in 1954.¹⁶ Creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in the latter year linked eight nations of East and West in a collective defense arrangement.¹⁷ The United States is the chief military mainstay of all these engagements. In some cases they have involved maintenance of bases and deployment of American forces in foreign countries, and in some cases the rendering of massive military aid.

BOMBER BASES ABROAD FOR MASSIVE RETALIATION

Republican campaigners in 1952 made much of Communist gains during the 20 years of Democratic ascendancy in the United States. At the same time, the Strategic Air

¹⁵ See "Spain and the Free World," *E.R.R.*, 1959 Vol. II, pp. 601-603.

¹⁶ See "Korea: Problem Protectorate," *E.R.R.*, 1960 Vol. I, p. 70, and "Problem of Formosa," *E.R.R.*, 1955 Vol. I, pp. 128-131.

¹⁷ Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United States.

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Command was coming into its own as a powerful nuclear bombing force. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles accordingly was encouraged to proclaim a policy of "massive retaliation" against aggressors. In New York on Jan. 12, 1954, he told the Council on Foreign Relations that "Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power." The United States must stand ready to answer Communist aggression by instant retaliation "by means and at places of our own choosing."

Ability to make this policy fully effective required a capacity to carry out the threat of retaliation if need arose. Declaration of the policy of massive retaliation thus underlined the need for foreign bases. Round-trip flights to deliver retaliatory blows on Soviet territory, for example, could be accomplished with planes then available only from bases closer to the target than those in continental United States. Development of longer-range planes and of tanker planes for refueling in the air have made round-trip bombing missions from this country to some potential Soviet targets theoretically possible, but foreign bases are still needed for many bombers not yet obsolete and for attainment of highly desirable flexibility in combat operations.

Strategic Air Command bases in the United States and abroad are linked by radio with S.A.C. headquarters at Omaha for instantaneous communication. Overseas bases assigned exclusively to S.A.C. include four in England, three in Spain, two in Morocco (three until last March 4), and one each in the Azores, Bermuda, Puerto Rico and Guam. These installations serve as bomber home bases and as bases for refueling and recovery operations. They also make possible wide dispersal of the bomber force. Dispersal increases the number of targets an enemy would have to try to knock out, and improves the chances for survival of a substantial portion of the force in event of attack.

The airborne alert is another factor that may be vital for survival. When Congress returned for its short summer session, Aug. 8, President Eisenhower told it that he had ordered further strengthening of S.A.C.'s "capability to conduct a continuous airborne alert." Although it had been widely assumed that one-fourth of S.A.C.'s bombers were in the air and ready for combat at all times, Albert Wohlstetter of the Rand Corporation pointed last year to

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published figures of average monthly flying time which indicated that no more than 6 per cent of the bombers were then in the air at one time.¹⁸

An important step toward giving maximum effectiveness to American nuclear striking power, if it should have to be used, was announced Aug. 17 by Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates, Jr. A central interservice planning group was set up that day to assign potential enemy targets in advance to particular services and particular weapons. This arrangement, in addition to assuring more complete readiness for retaliation, was expected to ease current Air Force-Navy rivalry for control of the Polaris missile.

Diminishing Need for Overseas Bases

RECENT spectacular advances in development of long-range missiles and of earth satellites have raised the prospect of a day when the United States will no longer need foreign bases for national security. That day may never come, but overseas bases in any case seem likely to play a less vital part in defense of the country as the years pass. Missiles presumably stand a better chance of getting through to their targets than do bombing planes, and without risking American lives. S.A.C.'s European and North African bases, moreover, appear now to be vulnerable to Soviet missiles.

Whatever the future may hold in the way of orbiting satellites capable of hurling missiles on earth targets, reconnaissance satellites that can spot such targets seem to be close at hand. Whether all this will lead in the end to pushbutton warfare from military and scientific installations on the home territory of the belligerents, no one can say. Current missile and satellite development appears to be headed in that direction. It is recognized, meanwhile, that the superpowers already have the means of mutual destruction.

Both the United States and Russia have developed, or are developing, an array of intermediate, long-range, and specialized missiles. The American Thor, several score of

¹⁸ Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1959, p. 218.

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which have been deployed at overseas bases, has a reported range of more than 1,700 miles. Another intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Jupiter, also is operational. The T-2, a corresponding Russian missile, is said to be capable of reaching targets 1,600 miles distant. The American intercontinental ballistic missile Atlas, now operational, was fired 9,000 miles down the South Atlantic range and into the Indian Ocean on May 20, and the Titan, also an I.C.B.M., has passed its initial tests. The Soviet T-3 I.C.B.M. has a reported range of 5,000 to 7,000 miles; it supposedly was one of the missiles fired 7,700 miles into the Pacific from an undisclosed Russian launching site on Jan. 20. A transit of 8,000 miles was reportedly attained by two more Soviet missiles shot into the Pacific in July.

The Institute of Strategic Studies, a research group formed in England in 1958, reported last Dec. 2 that the Soviet Union had around 100 missile bases situated between Lake Ladoga, northeast of Leningrad, and Archangel; along the coast of the Baltic Sea; in the Ukraine; and in East Germany southwest of Berlin. Seven I.R.B.M. bases under NATO command include the four Thor bases in England, two Jupiter bases under construction in Italy, and a projected Jupiter base in Turkey.¹⁹ Each base has, or will have, 15 missiles.

In the United States the Air Force has started construction of 19 I.C.B.M. bases in the West. A total of nine Atlas missiles has been reported combat-ready on launchers at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Francis E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Thirteen Atlas squadrons, each with six or nine missiles, are planned, but construction of the bases has been reported behind schedule. It was announced June 1 that the first squadron of the solid-fuel Minuteman, an I.C.B.M. still under development, will contain 55 missiles distributed among launching sites in three counties in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in central Montana. Most of the I.C.B.M. bases will be "hardened," with the missiles protected in underground concrete bays. It has been reported that some Minutemen may be mounted on mobile bases—railroad cars.²⁰

¹⁹ When the State Department confirmed the agreement for the base in Turkey, last Oct. 30, it said a plan for an I.R.B.M. base in Greece had been abandoned. Original plans for such bases in France and West Germany also have been given up, the former because of friction with France over control of nuclear warheads.

²⁰ *Aviation Week*, June 20, 1960, p. 101.

Foreign Bases: Declining Asset

The great advantages of both mobility and concealment are offered by the submarine-based Polaris intermediate-range missile. Two of the weapons were successfully fired from a submerged nuclear submarine, the *George Washington*, for the first time on July 20 and traveled 1,150 miles down the South Atlantic missile-firing range from Cape Canaveral, Fla. This historic event promised a highly significant contribution to Western defense, for most principal Russian cities are within 1,200 miles of some point on the high seas.

Five of the floating missile bases, which can circumnavigate the globe without surfacing, are expected to be in operation within a year and will considerably reduce this country's dependence on foreign bases.²¹ Reports last year that a Soviet-built nuclear submarine was undergoing trials have not been confirmed. The Institute of Strategic Studies said in December that the Soviets had a missile, the Komet, that could be fired from a submerged submarine but that it had a range of only 95 miles.

ROLE OF FOREIGN BASES IN BRUSHFIRE EMERGENCIES

It has been observed by John H. Herz, associate professor of government at City College, New York, that "With bombs and missiles of unlimited range and power, control of extended territories, systems of bases and allies would become unnecessary, indeed, liabilities because of their vulnerability."²² That point has not yet been reached; in fact, there is question whether American need for foreign bases will ever be obviated by missile developments alone. There is wide belief that the superpowers may already have reached a position of nuclear stalemate. For the destructive power of hydrogen weapons is so great that they may actually have reduced the risk of full-scale war.

B. H. Liddell Hart, British military analyst, has pointed out, however, that: "To the extent that [the nuclear bomb] reduces the likelihood of all-out war, it increases the possibilities of 'limited war' pursued by indirect and widespread local aggression. . . . For the 'containment' of the men-

²¹ Although a missile-launching submarine costs about \$100 million, and each Polaris missile around \$1 million, increased reliance on missiles and reduced reliance on foreign bases might result in a financial saving.

Development of missiles has created need for a new kind of foreign base. The United States has built a giant radar station at Thule, Greenland, which with similar stations under construction in Alaska and England will form a link in the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.

²² John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (1959), p. 23.

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ace we now become more dependent on 'conventional weapons.'"²³ And readiness to fight limited or brushfire engagements to curb aggression is expected to require retention of a certain number of foreign bases, just as it requires maintenance of ground forces and stocks of non-nuclear weapons.

Stationing of 300,000 U.S. Army troops on the European continent²⁴ evidences the continuing need to be prepared for conventional war and for dangerous situations short of war, and troops and planes require bases. A military expert has pointed out: "If the United States had not had the air base at Adana, Turkey, it could not have sent airborne troops to Lebanon [in 1958]. If it does not have a base in the Philippines, it cannot send airborne troops to South Vietnam, Laos or Thailand."²⁵ Without its large base at Yokosuka, Japan, moreover, the U.S. Navy would have no major repair and supply facilities for its Far East units nearer than Pearl Harbor, and its ability to meet American commitments in that part of the world would be correspondingly reduced.

South Korea obviously would have been promptly overwhelmed by the Communist invaders in 1950 if the United States had not had strong forces in Japan. The continued presence of such danger spots in various parts of the world suggests that the United States may need to maintain foreign bases of one kind or another for a long time to come—for its own protection and for the protection of the free world.

²³ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (1954), p. 17.

²⁴ Maj. Gen. Max S. Johnson, "NATO: Shield or Sieve?" *U.S. News & World Report*, Nov. 16, 1959, p. 57.

²⁵ Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, "Overseas Bases," *New Republic*, Aug. 8, 1960, p. 16.



